NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 12 | Number 1

Article 13

12-1-1933

Declaratory Judgments -- Recent Trends
Joe Eagles

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Joe Eagles, Declaratory Judgments -- Recent Trends, 12 N.C. L. Rev. 57 (1933).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol12/iss1/13

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
knowledge of the plaintiff's first marriage tends to show that the
breach did not result proximately from the disclosure. But the disclosure itself was a clear invasion of the plaintiff's right of privacy
in his communications with others. 19 In an analogous class of cases
dealing with the tapping of telephone wires, substantial compensatory
damages are recoverable, even where there is no injurious use of the
information obtained. 2° If the right of privacy in communications
is to receive the protection which its importance to the individual
merits, it would seem that the courts should assess substantial damages upon those who violate it.
ERVID ERIC ERICSON.
Declaratory Judgments-Recent Trends.
Plaintiff sued in the New York state courts for an injunction to
restrain the sale of reclassified stock of defendant corporation and
for a declaratory judgment as to the rights of preferred stockholders
under the Delaware reclassification statute. The cause was removed
to the Federal District Court in New York, the injunction denied,
and the complaint dismissed without prejudice to any rights plaintiff
might have in the matter. On appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the denial of an injunction, but held it was error to dismiss
the application for a declaratory judgment.1
In three leading cases, 2 the Supreme Court of the United States
uttered dicta, criticized as unwarranted and inappropriate, 3 to the
effect that the requirements of a case or controversy under Article
III of thd Constitution prevented declaratory judgments in the Federal Courts, originally or by removal. These dicta were followed in
subsequent cases. 4 Recently, by a unanimous opinion in Nashville,
Green, The Right of Privacy (1932) 27 ILL. L. Ray. 237, 252.
'Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S. W. (2d) 46 (1931) commented
on 1(1932) 11 Oma. L. Rav. 217.
Harr et. al. v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 2d,
1933).
'Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70, 47 Sup. Ct. 282, 71 L. ed.
541 (1927); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers Co-op. Ass'n.,
276 U. S. 71, 48 Sup. Ct. 291, 72 L. ed. 473 (1928); Willing v. Chicago
Auditorium Ass'n., 277 U. S. 274, 48 Sup. Ct. 507, 72 L. ed. 880 (1928).
'Borchard, The Supreme Court and the Declaratory Judgment (1928)

14

A. B. A. J. 633, 635.
'State of Arizona v. State of California, 283 U. S. 423, 51 Sup. Ct. 522, 75
L. ed. 1154 (1931) ; Lamoreaux v. Kinney, 41 F. (2d) 30 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930) ;
Marty v. Nagle, 44 F. (2d) 695 (C. C.A. 9th, 1930) ; City of Osceola, Iowa v.
Utilities Holding Corp., 55 F. (2d) 155 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932); Chicago Bank
of Commerce v. McPherson, 62 F. (2d) 393 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932.)

58
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C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace,5 the Court seemingly reversed itself
and to some extent opened the Federal Courts for declaratory judgments. In that case, on appeal from the Supreme Court of Tennessee, a declaratory judgment under the Tennessee Declaratory
Judgment Act was held entitled to review in the Supreme Court as
of right under Section 237a of the Judicial Code.
The principal case is the first reported application for a declaratory judgment in the Federal Courts since the Nashville case. In
the latter, a declaratory judgment was used for a situation traditionally handled by injunction. This may imply a limitation upon the
scope of declaratory judgments in the Federal Courts. The case
under discussion, however, seems free from this limitation, for here
the Circuit Court of Appeals held a declaratory judgment available
notwithstanding its approval of the order denying an injunction.
On the question of removal the Court said in Willing v. Chicago
Auditorium Ass'n

that an application for a declaratory judgment

should have been remanded to the state courts for failure to present
a case or controversy under Article III. In the principal case, also a
removal case, the Court apparently takes a different view, 7 unless the
last sentence quoted in the note from the opinion qualifies its position.
If that qualification is effective, must some more traditional type of
procedure be invoked to gain standing in the Federal Courts in order
to secure, as an adjunct thereto, a declaratory judgment?
Five cases have come before the Supreme Court of North Carolina since the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act s was enacted in
1931. In three of these cases the declaratory judgment was denied.
'Nashville, Chattanooga, and St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 53

Sup. Ct. 345, 77 L. ed. 444 (1933).

(Plaintiff sued in courts of Tennessee for

a declaratory judgment to the effect that a state excise tax 'was, as applied to
him, unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held the tax valid,
and plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States) commented
upon (1932) 42 YAI.n L. J. 974, (1932) 46 HARv. L. R. 850.
' Supra note 2.
"Harr et al. v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., supra note 1, at 335 ("The name
given the relief sought is of no particular moment. The controversy is clearly
adverse and over matters 'which are justiceable in a District court when there
is a diversity of citizenship and the requisite amount is involved. We think
Nashville, Chattanooga, and St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace is authority for deciding
the case fully on the merits. An added reason is found in that, where equitable
jurisdiction has been properly invoked in an adversary suit for the purpose of
seeking an injunction, the court may dispose of the entire controversy between
the parties to the action").
1 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §628. See Van Hecke, The North Carolina DeclaratoryJudgment Act (1931) 10 N. C. L. R. 1, for valuable discussion
of the procedure, uses and advantages of declaratory judgments.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
In the other two it was granted. This does not mean that the Act has
not been given liberal interpretation or that the potentialities of the
procedure as an alternative remedy 9 have been overlooked. The
denials were based on plaintiff's failure to present an adversary dispute on a question of legal import in connection with his application
for a declaratory judgment to settle his racial status ;1o on the belief
that probate under provisions of Section 4163 of the consolidated
statutes ought still to be the exclusive procedure to determine the
validity of a will ;" and on the fact that plaintiff's complaint stated
a cause of action which had already accrued under an insurance policy, and not a prayer for anticipatory relief. 12 The two instances in
which the Court upheld declaratory judgments illustrate the value
of the new remedy. In one a deed was construed in advance of any
breach of covenants and the rights of the parties set forth.18 In the
other, a recent and most important case, the Court determined the
rights of the city, the traction company, and the public under a street14
car franchise from the city of Raleigh.
JOE EAGLES.

Evidence-Trial Judge's Power of Comment.
In Quercia v. United States' the court charged the jury that
defendant had wiped his hands during his testimony and that such a
mannerism was almost always an indication of lying, and further,
that he thought everything the defendant said was a lie. Held:
Prejudical error.
Under the common law, trial judges had the power of commenting and expressing their opinion upon the evidence. 2 This rule is
still followed in English courts3 and in the federal courts of the
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §628 ("Courts of record within their
-respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other
legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed").
. In Re George C. Eubanks, 202 N. C. 357, 162 S. E. 769 (1932). See
Miller v. Currie, 242 N. W. 570 (Wis. 1932) (a declaratory judgment as to
plaintiff's legitimacy is possible under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment
Act.) Commented upon (1932) 46 HAR. L. REv. 336.
' Poore v. Poore, 201 N. C. 791, 161 S. E. 532 (1931).

" Green v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. of Cincinnati, 203 N. C. 767, 167 S. .
38 (1932).
'Walker
Phelps,
N. C.
162 S.203E.N.727C. (1932).
"' Carolina v.Power
and202
Light
Co.344,
v. Isley,
811, 167 S. E. 56 (1933).
177 L.ed. 996 (1933).
'Capitol Traction Co. v. Hoff, 174 U. S. 1, 19 Sup. Ct. 580, 43 L. ed. 873
(1899) ; HALE, HisTORy OF THE. CoMmox LAW (1792) 291; 16 C.
"Jefferson v. Paskell, 1 K. B. 57 (1916).

J. 939 §2308b.

